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ABSTRACT
Almost two decades ago, Matthew Silberman (1976) proposed and 
tested a general theory of deterrence. Since that time, research has produced 
inconsistent findings about the principles and dynamics of deterrence. I draw 
from criticisms of Silberman’s work and from refinements in theories of 
deviance and social control to further test Silberman’s core ideas. The key 
independent variables include moral commitment to the norm, peer 
involvement, perceived certainty of punishment, and perceived severity of 
punishment. The current study examines self-report data describing definitions 
about and use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine. The sample consists of 729 
undergraduates at a mid-Atlantic university. After replicating many of 
Silberman’s analyses, the data reveal overall support for his general theory of 
deterrence.
DRUG USE AND DETERRENCE: A TEST OF 
SILBERMAN’S GENERAL THEORY
INTRODUCTION
Theories of deterrence have been in existence nearly as long as the discipline 
of sociology itself. However, deterrence as a major explanatory paradigm for crime 
and deviance was not widely researched until the late 1960’s (see Andenaes, 1966; 
Chambliss, 1966; Gibbs, 1968; Jensen, 1969; Tittle, 1969; Zimring and Hawkins, 
1968). The concept of deterrence refers generally to the constraining effects of 
sanctions and of rules and laws that threaten sanctions. General deterrence refers to 
constraint that results from witnessing the punishment of others. Specific deterrence 
refers to the constraining effects of punishment on the subject under observation 
(Gibbs, 1975:34,38). Deterrence theories are based in utilitarian and exchange 
theories that depict individuals as rational beings who weigh the costs and benefits of 
their actions. Theorists "attempt to spell out those conditions under which the 
perceived risk of punishment (cost) counterbalances the estimated gains from an act 
sufficiently to prevent commission of that act" (Geerken and Gove, 1975:497).
This research focuses on drug use as it relates to the deterrence doctrine. 
There are several reasons for examining deviant drug use. First, drug use is widely 
regarded as a problem of epidemic proportions. Since the 1980’s, the U.S. 
government has declared a "war on drugs" in a very literal sense, at times using
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military force to sanction drug commerce. Aday (1990:231) predicts that not only 
will the acceptance of this strategy of social control continue to grow, but it will 
continue to "make drug trafficking the most lucrative industry in the history of 
modem nations." Drugs that have been prohibited or regulated include marijuana, 
cocaine, heroin, and various opium derivatives. Aday and Thomson (1992:420) note 
that although these drugs have been portrayed by the popular media as dangerous or 
even lethal, there is evidence that some are less dangerous or destructive than drugs 
that are not criminally prohibited. For example, tobacco and alcohol use are known 
to be dangerous to health and to contribute directly to loss of life and property 
destruction.
Second, there are strong conventional beliefs about deterring the possession, 
distribution, and use of illegal drugs. There are those who feel that drug users and 
dealers should receive severe prison sentences if arrested. There are others who have 
argued for decriminalization or deregulation of illegal drugs. Almost everyone would 
agree that murder or rape is wrong. On the other hand, there probably are widely 
discrepant attitudes about drugs and drug use.
Third, drug use is subject to both informal and formal social control. Aday 
and Anderson (1991:24) define social control as "the punishment of an individual or 
collective act that has been identified as a violation." Aday’s (1990) model of social 
control identifies two major types of social control: 1) formal, which is derived from 
laws and specialized agencies; and 2) informal, which is derived from interpersonal 
relationships1. According to Aday, our society has changed from reliance on informal
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social control to pervasive use of formal, coercive control. Paradoxically, Aday and 
Thomson (1992) suggest that informal methods of social control, such as advertising 
and education, rather than the current national drug policy encouraging formal means 
of social control, may be more effective for dealing with illegal drug use.
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I. THEORETICAL ISSUES
Some of the first research done on deterrence by social scientists tested for a 
general deterrence effect (see Savitz, 1958; Schuessler, 1952). For example, Sellin 
(1967) examined states’ use of the death penalty to test for a general deterrence effect 
on homicide rates and found no substantial evidence to support the deterrence 
hypothesis. However, later researchers looked at penalties other than death and many 
found support for their hypotheses (see, for example, Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; 
Erickson and Gibbs, 1977). The current study focuses only on specific deterrence.
Another theoretical issue concerns the conceptualization of the threat of 
punishment. The threat of punishment is a central variable in deterrence doctrine. It 
can be measured in a number of ways. Threat of punishment usually is 
conceptualized in three dimensions: certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment. 
Many researchers measure only certainty and severity of punishment, Erickson and 
Gibbs (1977:253) note that social scientists tend to be divided in their approaches: 
"studies have been limited either (1) to objective properties of punishment (for 
example, the ratio of prison admissions to offenses reported to the police) or (2) to 
perceptual properties (for example, the perceived risk of arrest)."
Waldo and Chiricos (1972) researched individual perceptions of the severity
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and certainty of punishment as they relate to self-reported rates of marijuana use and 
petty larceny. The authors employed an interview schedule with a sample of 321 
university students. They found no relationship between self-reported criminality and 
the respondents’ perception of the severity of punishment for those crimes. They 
report a significant relationship between certainty of punishment and crimes reported, 
but the degree of the relationship depended on the type of offense (Waldo and 
Chiricos, 1972:536). They conclude that results do not provide adequate support for 
the deterrence hypothesis.
Meier and Johnson (1977) found legal variables to be insufficient for 
explaining deterrent effects. Six hundred and thirty-two adults were asked to provide 
descriptions of the frequencies of their own use of marijuana. The authors found 
compelling evidence to support their hypothesis that social, extralegal factors played a 
more important role in deterring use. In fact, they found that the variables of "age, 
fear of physical consequences of [marijuana] use, and beliefs that marijuana use is 
immoral" had much greater effects on marijuana use than did traditional legal 
variables such as the perceived certainty and severity of punishment (Meier and 
Johnson 302).
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II. CORE CONCEPTS
I use Silberman’s (1976) concepts to examine the dynamics of deterrence. The 
first two core independent variables, perceived severity of punishment and perceived 
certainty of punishment, are derived from Silberman’s conceptualization of perceived 
threat. The next two variables, moral commitment to the norm and peer involvement, 
are derived from Silberman’s general theory of deterrence and other theories of 
deviance. Drug use, the dependent variable, will be described in the section on index 
construction.
Perceived certainty o f  punishment is measured as the degree to which 
individuals perceive the possibility of negative sanctioning, or punishment, for an act 
or acts. Although typically researchers have measured both certainty and severity of 
punishment, and at times have found an interaction effect between the two variables, 
certainty of punishment has been examined as a factor of deterrence independent of 
the severity of punishment. Silberman (1976:445) did not define the concept of threat 
of punishment as such. Instead, he measured perceived certainty of punishment as the 
respondents’ perceptions of "how likely the police would be to catch ’someone like 
yourself if you committed any of the offenses." The answer choices were as follows: 
very likely, likely, unlikely, or very unlikely. I use an index of certainty of
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punishment that consists of Likert-scaled items that are similar to Silberman’s (1976). 
They ask respondents to indicate the likelihood of their being arrested for drug-related 
crimes. The possible responses are as follows: no chance at all, a slight possibility, 
somewhat likely, and almost certain.
Perceived severity o f  punishment is measured as the degree to which 
individuals perceive that punishment will have a negative effect on their lives. 
Silberman (1976:445) measured perceived severity of punishment as the degree to 
which respondents thought "they would be very likely, likely, unlikely or very 
unlikely to get the maximum [state] penalty if they were convicted of committing each 
one of the offenses."
Grasmick and McLaughlin (1978) criticize this measure as ineffective for 
describing severity of punishment. They argue that this measure does not take into 
account the evidence of variation in people’s perceptions of the maximum legal 
penalty vary. For example, although two people may perceive the maximum legal 
penalty for drinking in public to be a $100 fine, some may think this is a very severe 
penalty, while the others consider it to be a slap on the wrist.
I use an index of punishment severity that consists of Likert-scaled items 
asking respondents to indicate the degree to which they think their futures would be 
negatively affected if they were convicted for drug-related crimes2.
Moral commitment to the norm is defined as internalized values that conform 
to some rule or law.3 Silberman cites Mead’s conception of moral commitment as 
societal norms that are "internalized to become self-regulatory mechanisms"
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(1976:453). In contrast, Tittle (1977) attributes the concept to the structural- 
functional theory of Talcott Parsons and his followers. Silberman’s (1976:445) 
questionnaire asked respondents Hto rate each of the eleven offenses according to 
whether it was always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes wrong or not at all wrong." 
The sum of these responses comprised his morality index. I use a morality index that 
consists of a set of Likert-scaled items asking respondents about the wrongness of 
drug use. (See Appendix I.)
Peer involvement reflects the concept of differential association proposed by 
Edwin Sutherland. Most researchers have found that interaction with peers involved 
in deviant or criminal activities has a positive effect on criminal involvement in 
general, and a negative relationship with perception of the threat of punishment4 (cf. 
Tittle and Rowe, 1974). Silberman (1976:445) constructed a peer involvement index 
that was a "summated scale based on the number of offenses for which the respondent 
had known at least one person who had been arrested." My peer involvement index 
consists of items that ask for the number of friends known by the respondent who had 
ever used drugs.
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m . HYPOTHESES
Silberman’s propositions are derived from three general explanatory theories of 
crime and deviance: deterrence, moral commitment, and differential association5. 
(1976:457-458) I propose hypotheses that capture Silberman’s meanings; however, 
the language has been modified slightly to reflect the focus of the present work. The 
hypotheses, then, are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of moral support for the legal regulation 
of drug use, the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs (the moral 
commitment hypothesis).
Hypothesis 11: The greater the perceived threat of punishment for drug use, 
the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs (the deterrence hypothesis).
(The next two hypotheses are components of the deterrence hypothesis.)
Hypothesis 11A: The greater the perceived certainty of punishment for 
drug use, the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs.
Hypothesis 1IB: The greater the perceived severity of punishment for 
drug use, the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs.
Hypothesis III: The greater the degree of association with peers who have 
used drugs, the greater the probability that individuals will use drugs (the differential 
association hypothesis).
Hypothesis IV: The greater the perceived threat of punishment for drug use, 
the greater the degree of moral support for the legal regulation of drug use.
Hypothesis V: The greater the degree of moral support for the legal regulation 
of drug use, the smaller the degree of association with peers who have used drugs.
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Hypothesis VI: The greater the degree of association with peers who have 
used drugs, the greater the degree of perceived threat of punishment.
Silberman tested his deterrence propositions on both the individual (N=174) 
and the offense (N=9) levels of analysis, resulting in two distinct causal models. The 
hypotheses stated above will be tested on the individual level only.
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
The data for this study come from a campus survey conducted in the spring of 
1990 at a small mid-Atlantic university. Seventeen hundred questionnaires were 
mailed to a random sample of resident and non-resident undergraduate students of the 
university. Seven hundred and twenty-nine students returned completed 
questionnaires, yielding a response rate of 43 percent and comprising a 13.8 percent 
sample of the entire undergraduate population.
The original analyses by Aday and Anderson (1991) were aimed at developing 
an integrated theory of adolescent drug use using concepts derived from theories of 
social control, differential association, and deterrence. Aday and Anderson report 
weak relationships between measures of deterrence and drug violations. I believe that 
this resulted from weaknesses in the measurement of the construct of deterrence.
Aday and Anderson include only a measure of perceptions of severity of punishment. 
These researchers did not examine certainty of punishment as a part of the index of 
deterrence.
Control Variables
A disadvantage of using a sample of college undergraduates is the lack of
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variability in socio-demographic characteristics. Silberman faced the same 
disadvantage with his sample. He (1976:446) states:
There are several variables, extraneous to this study, that are generally 
expected to be associated with criminal behavior: age, ethnicity, urbanism, 
socioeconomic status and sex. The relatively high degree of homogeneity of 
the student population along the first four dimensions makes it superfluous to 
control these variables. The student body is predominantly composed of 
young (18-22 years of age), affluent, white residents of suburban communities 
surrounding several major metropolitan areas in the Eastern United 
States...The university is co-ed, however. Consequently, sex should be 
controlled for in order to see if males and females respond differently to the 
threat of punishment and other factors associated with criminal deterrence.
Items for age, urbanism, and gender are included in the 1990 campus survey.
References to ethnicity and socioeconomic status were not included in the survey.
Race was left out because of its presupposed homogeneity. Hence, student
respondents described by Silberman are not much different from those in the present
study.
The only significant difference appears to be in the measure of urbanism. The 
present survey asks respondents to describe the area where they grew up. The 
possible choices are rural (1), suburban (2), urban (3), and don’t know/can’t say (4). 
Roughly three quarters (73.6%) of the sample identified their childhood environment 
as suburban, 17 percent checked rural, seven percent indicated urban. Only three 
percent claimed they didn’t know or couldn’t say. Because of its variability and 
potential theoretical relevance, this item will be retained as a control variable. 
Specifically, urbanism will be measured as a scale from low (rural/urban = 1) to 
medium (suburban/urban=2) to high (urban/urban=3), treating don’t know/can’t say
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responses as missing cases.
Gender is coded as "1" for females, "2" for males. The sample is made up of 
443 females and 285 males, resulting in a 61-39 split, a ratio that slightly 
overrepresents females in the sample (females comprise 53.4% of the undergraduate 
population). Gender appears to be a more significant (and more interesting) control 
variable than urbanism. Like most studies of crime and deviance, Silberman’s 
(1976:447) study revealed that males were more likely than females to commit 
criminal offenses, and that males felt the deterrence effect more strongly than 
females. Aday and Anderson’s (1991) results suggest that similar findings are likely 
in this study.
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V. INDEX CONSTRUCTION AND BIVARIATE ANALYSES
The data were examined first through analyses of bivariate associations (using 
phi coefficients and Pearson’s r). See Tables 2 and 3 for results. These analyses 
provide the basis for constructing index measures of the independent and dependent 
variables.
Following Silberman’s (1976) procedures, the individual items representing the 
independent variables and the individual drug use measures were dichotomized in 
order to make comparisons of the bivariate relationships in 2x2 tables (see Table 1). 
For example, I examined the association between the indicator variable for moral 
commitment relative to alcohol use and the alcohol use variable.
Silberman (1976) used summed indexes to represent the key variables in his 
analysis of the deterrence effect on the individual level. Grasmick and Bryjak 
(1980:481) endorse this method of data reduction and cite two advantages. First, 
according to them, "a more precise presentation of results is possible" and, second, 
"the composite scales approximate an interval level of measurement and can be 
analyzed with familiar multiple regression techniques." Index reliability was 
considered through an examination of item to index correlations. Items were included 
only if those correlations were at least .50.
15
MORALITY is measured using three items, each of which asks respondents to 
agree or disagree with the following statement: "Regardless of how safe or dangerous 
(alcohol/marijuana/cocaine) might be, it is wrong to use if it is illegal to use." 
Response options comprise a Likert index ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The distribution of this index is presented in Appendix I. In later 
analyses, this and the other indexes are dichotomized using the index mean as the 
point of division. For example, those who scored from 3 to 9 on the morality index 
are categorized as low morality; those who scored from 10 to 15 are categorized as 
high morality. The resulting dichotomous variables are presented in Appendix I.
PEERS is composed of two items asking respondents, "Out of your five closest 
friends, estimate how many have ever used a drug (1. marijuana/2, cocaine)." The 
questionnaire contained no item for alcohol. However, if it had, there is a good 
probability it would have been unusable because of a lack of variance in the 
distribution (i.e. almost all would report having friends who used alcohol).
SEVERITY (perceived severity of threatened sanctions) is composed of three 
items asking respondents, "If you were arrested and convicted for 1) drinking in 
public, 2) possession of marijuana, or 3) selling a pound of cocaine, do you think 
your future would be affected negatively?" The possible responses were no (1), yes, 
a little (2), yes, somewhat (3), and yes, seriously (4).
CERTAINTY (perceived certainty of threatened sanctions) is measured using an 
item for alcohol that asks, "What do you think is the chance that you would be 
arrested if you were under 21 and drinking at a bar," and two items that ask, "If you
16
were selling 1) marijuana or 2) grams of cocaine from an apartment, what do you 
think would be the chance of getting arrested?" The possible responses were no 
chance at all (1), a slight possibility (2), somewhat likely (3), and almost certain(4).
DRUG USE is measured as self-reports of the use of alcohol, marijuana, and 
cocaine. The survey included items for each type of drug and asked for frequencies 
of use in the past week, past month, and past year. I dichotomized responses to 
"have used" and "have not used" for both marijuana and cocaine (cf. Gossweiler, 
1992:18). Almost 95% of the respondents in this study report use of alcohol at some 
time in their lives. Therefore, a measure of alcohol use as "ever" or "never" used 
(similar to the items for marijuana and cocaine) would be meaningless because of the 
lack of variance. Accordingly, I used a single item from the questionnaire that asks 
respondents to report the number of days in the past month that they were intoxicated 
by alcohol. This measure was collapsed into two categories, "was not intoxicated" 
and "was intoxicated at least once." Sixty-one percent of respondents reported that 
they were intoxicated at least once in the past month. By contrast, only 11% reported 
having used marijuana in the past month, and four respondents (0.5%) reported 
having used cocaine in the past month.
These three measures of drug use were then summed to create a drug use 
index, which served as a measure of the dependent variable. The index ranges from 
0 to 3 and has a mean of 1.1. Although they are not identical to those used by 
Silberman (1976), the indexes I have constructed for the core concepts of the theory 
are conceptually and empirically similar to those in Silberman’s original research.
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VI. ANALYSIS
Measuring association
Table 2 presents phi coefficients for associations between the dependent 
variables (drug use by type) and the independent variables that refer to those types. 
The indicator variables were dichotomized (as described in Table 1) in order to 
construct 2x2 tables.
Table 3 presents correlations between the index measures of the key 
independent variables, the drug use variables, and the drug use index. At first 
glance, it appears that the deterrent effect from all sources is strongest for marijuana, 
followed by alcohol, and then cocaine. Overall, the coefficients are weak to moderate 
for morality and peer involvement, and even weaker for the threat of punishment 
(certainty and severity). Note the stronger association between the drug use index and 
the index measures of the key independent variables. This finding is consonant with 
Silberman*s (1976) observation that the deterrent effect is more apparent when non­
specific indexes are correlated. The correlation between peer involvement and 
marijuana use is particularly striking. While the phi and Pearson coefficients are very 
similar for the other bivariate relationships, there is a marked increase from the phi 
coefficient for marijuana use and peer involvement in Table 2 (<£ =  .39; p <  .001) to
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the Pearson coefficient for the corresponding index measures in Table 3 (r= .61; 
p <  .001). It appears that the association between drug use and peer involvement is 
not well captured by the 0-1 dichotomies in Table 2.
There are important differences between the findings for this study and those 
reported by Silberman (1976). Silberman found a positive but insignificant 
correlation between severity of punishment and the dependent variable, measured 
using a criminal involvement index. In fact, Silberman (1976) reports positive 
relationships between the severity of punishment index and all of the individual 
offenses, except for assault. In the current study, analyses reveal significant although 
weak negative correlations between the severity of punishment index and both the 
drug use index and the use variables (see Table 3). In fact, the bivariate correlations 
are stronger for the severity measure than they are for the certainty of punishment 
measure. This finding is exactly opposite from the results reported by Silberman.
This discrepancy may result from differences in the measurement of severity 
of punishment. Silberman (1976:445) measured perceived severity by asking 
respondents "whether they would be very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely to 
get the maximum [state] penalty if they were convicted of committing each one of the 
offenses." In the present study, respondents were asked whether they think their 
"future would be affected negatively" if they were arrested and convicted for crimes 
related to alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine. Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) used both 
measures of severity of punishment in their analysis of the deterrence effect. They 
characterized the former as the conventional measure and the latter as the refined
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measure. They found the refined measure of severity, in conjunction with certainty of 
punishment, to be a better predictor of illegal behavior.
Table 4 presents the zero-order correlation coefficients for all of the index 
variables. The directions of the relationships are consistent with the hypotheses.
Two correlations are particularly interesting: the fairly strong correlation between the 
morality index and the drug use index (r=-.44) and that between the peer involvement 
index and the drug use index (r= .63). Both are statistically significant beyond the 
.001 level. Compared to morality and peer involvement, the severity and certainty of 
punishment measures have weak associations with drug use. The findings are 
consistent with those reported by Silberman, except for those concerning the severity 
index variable. Not only does the current severity measure have a negative 
association with drug use, but its coefficient is larger than that between certainty and 
drug use (r= -.24  and r= -.16 , respectively).
Controlling fo r  gender
Following Silberman’s (1976) lead, I examined the data to consider the effects 
of gender. A total of 443 females (60.9%) and 285 males (39.1%) responded to the 
gender question. Both males and females reported drug use. However, a higher 
proportion of males than females report use. Fifty-six percent of females and 69 
percent of males reported being intoxicated at least once in the past month. Thirty- 
three percent of the females and 49 percent of the males report having used marijuana 
at least once; six percent of the females, compared to 13 percent of the males, report
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having tried cocaine at least once. The differences in frequencies of alcohol and 
marijuana use between females and males are significant beyond the .001 level 
(X2 =  11.92 and 20.13, respectively). The gender difference on cocaine use is smaller 
(X2=9.37; pC .O l).
Looking at the drug use index, the mean score for males is 1.31 compared to 
0.95 for females. This difference is significant beyond the .001 level (data not 
shown). The differences in rates of usage by males and females for each drug are not 
extreme. Rather, generally males report higher frequencies of use on all drugs. This 
is consistent with the findings reported by Aday and Anderson (1990).
When comparing the correlations among the index measures of the independent 
and dependent variables for males and fern ales-(see Table 5), there are very slight 
differences. Some noticeable differences are in certainty of punishment, where there 
is a weaker association between certainty and drug use for males (r=-.12; not sig.) 
than for females (r= -. 16; pc.O O l). Also, the association between peer involvement 
and drug use is slightly stronger for males (r= .66) than for females (r= .60). These 
correlations do not support Silberman’s (1976) finding that the deterrence effect is felt 
more strongly for males. In fact, it appears that deterrence may apply more to 
females; however, the results here do not support any substantial conclusions.
Testing fo r  interaction
Many researchers have suggested possible interactions among deterrence 
variables. Silberman (1976) examined interactions in his analyses. Following his
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example, I dichotomized the index measures of the independent variables by dividing 
their distributions above and below the means. The resulting categories are groups 
that are "low" and "high" on each variable. The means for each of the indexes are 
presented in Table 6.
I looked at mean drug use scores for the groups categorized as "low" or 
"high" on each of the following variables: morality, peer involvement, certainty and 
severity. I then looked at drug use scores for those low and high categories on each 
of those variables while controlling for other variables. For each index, there is a 
significant difference between the means of the low and high groups. The most 
significant difference occurs between those scoring low on the peer involvement index 
compared to those scoring high (t=-17.60; p c .0 0 1 ). Another significant difference 
is obvious for the mean drug use scores of those who scored low versus high on the 
morality index (t=10.39; p <  .001). A close look at this table reveals that the t-scores 
for the differences between the low and high drug use scores for groups on the peer 
involvement index and on the morality index are on average higher than the t-scores 
for the differences between the low and high groups on the severity and certainty 
indexes.
Before testing for interaction, I did a regression analysis with the drug use 
index as the dependent variable, and index measures of the core independent variables 
(morality, peer involvement, severity and certainty). The results of this analysis are 
shown in Table 7.
I decided to test for interaction among the independent variables by using
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product terms in a multiple regression analysis.6 Using the four index variables, I 
computed six interaction terms based on the total number of possible combinations: 
MORALITYxPEERS, MORALITYxSEVERITY, MORALITYxCERTAINTY, 
PEERSxSEVERITY, PEERSxCERTAINTY, and SEVERITYxCERTAINTY. The 
formula for the test is
r =  a +  B,MP +  B2MS +  B3MC +  B4PS +  B5PC +  B6SC, 
where a is the constant and Bn is the standardized regression coefficient (Grasmick and 
Bryjak, 1980:483). The results of the analysis using the interaction terms are shown 
in Table 8.
I compared the model with interaction terms to the original model. The 
interaction term model explains 43 percent of the variance in the drug use index, 
whereas the four index variables account for 44 percent of the variance. The 
interaction terms do not increase the explanatory power of the model. However, the 
product term for morality and severity is significant (B=-.198; t —-3.009; p c .O l) . I 
ran a third model regressing drug use on peer involvement, certainty, and the 
morality-severity term to see if any improvements were made on the original model 
(see Table 9). The third model had explained variance (r2) of .44 and the Beta 
coefficient for morality-severity increased only to -.224 (p<  .001), not much 
improvement over the original model. The explanatory value of interactions among 
the independent variables appear to be negligible.
23
The fu ll model
Table 10 presents results of the regression analysis using the full model, which 
includes the four index measures of the primary independent variables and the control 
variables, gender and urbanism. Standardized coefficients only are presented because 
of the differing metrics among the independent variables. Of the four core 
independent variables, only morality and peer involvement are significant predictors 
of drug use. Forty-five percent of the variance is explained by the full model, and 
most of this is attributable to the peer involvement index.
Based on the findings here and an examination of articles dealing with path 
analysis, I do not feel that a replication of Silberman’s (1976) causal model is 
warranted. This point is developed further in the following discussion.
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vn. DISCUSSION
Hypotheses
Hypothesis I: The higher the degree of moral support for the legal regulation 
of drug use, the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs (the moral 
commitment hypothesis).
There is support for the moral commitment hypothesis, based on the moderate 
negative correlation of .44, found between the morality index and the drug use index. 
The bivariate Pearson correlations are presented in Table 4.
Hypothesis 11: The greater the perceived threat of punishment for drug use, 
the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs (the deterrence hypothesis).
I tested the two hypotheses that are the components of the deterrence 
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 11A: The greater the perceived certainty of punishment for 
drug use, the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs.
Based on the negative correlation of .16 found between certainty and drug use, 
there is support for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis IIB: The greater the perceived severity of punishment for 
drug use, the lower the probability that individuals will use drugs.
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This hypothesis is also supported, based on its -.24 correlation with the drug 
use index.
Hypothesis III: The greater the degree of association with peers who have 
used drugs, the greater the probability that individuals will use drugs (the differential 
association hypothesis).
This hypothesis is supported by the strong correlation of .63 found between 
the peer involvement index and the drug use index.
Hypothesis IV: The greater the perceived threat of punishment for drug use, 
the greater the degree of moral support for the legal regulation of drug use.
The bivariate relationships reported in Table 4 suggest overall support for this 
hypothesis. I find that the relationships between the three index measures of moral 
commitment, certainty of punishment, and severity of punishment are in the correct, 
positive direction. Furthermore, when comparing group means of certainty and 
severity of punishment on the level of moral commitment, those who scored high on 
the severity and certainty index measures had a higher level of moral commitment as 
well. Silberman, who examined deterrence on both the individual and offense levels 
of analysis, found this hypothesis to be valid only for the offense level of analysis.
Hypothesis V: The greater the degree of moral support for the legal regulation 
of drug use, the smaller the degree of association with peers who have used drugs.
The bivariate correlation of -.39 in Table 4 between the moral commitment 
and peer involvement indexes supports this hypothesis. Silberman found this
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hypothesis to be true only for the individual level of analysis.
Hypothesis VI: The greater the degree of association with peers who have 
used drugs, the greater the degree of perceived threat of punishment.
This is the only hypothesis that cannot be supported here. In fact, there are 
inverse relationships between the peer involvement index measure and both the 
certainty and severity of punishment indexes, as can be seen in Table 4.
Some researchers have argued that the effects of the threat of punishment (in 
this case, certainty and severity) on criminal behavior are dependent on either peer 
involvement (Tittle and Rowe, 1974) or moral commitment to the norm (Zimring, 
1971). Silberman’s research and that reported here provide empirical support for 
these findings. I find that although the effects of the severity and certainty indexes on 
the drug use index are direct, it appears that these effects are mediated by morality 
and peer involvement.
Addressing Silberman’s critics
In their review of his article, Grasmick and McLaughlin (1978) argued that 
Silberman’s (1976) research made a significant contribution to deterrence research. 
They noted that it was the first deterrence study to be published in the American 
Sociological Review or the American Journal of Sociology. Yet, they also noted 
some theoretical and methodological problems with the research that they comment on
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at length. The research reported here responds to some of the identified problems.
First, Grasmick and McLaughlin contend that Silberman (1976) failed to test 
for the "credibility of severe sanctions" hypothesis (see Tittle and Logan, 1973), 
which asserts that "...perceived severity of punishment has a deterrent effect only 
when the perceived certainty of punishment is high. In other words, certainty is a 
conditional variable in the relationship between severity and criminal involvement" 
(Grasmick and McLaughlin, 1978:274). As noted earlier (see especially Table 4 and 
related discussion), not only is the zero-order correlation between severity and drug 
use higher than the correlation between certainty and drug use, the partial correlation 
between severity and drug use drops t o -.21 (pC.OOl) when controlling for certainty. 
Furthermore, if I select only those respondents who scored high on the certainty 
index, and then compute a zero-order correlation between severity and drug use, the 
coefficient is practically unchanged (r=-.23; p c .0 0 1 ).
The second criticism concerns Silberman’s use of an inadequate measure of 
severity of punishment. As noted earlier, the refined measure of severity of 
punishment suggested by Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) was used for this research. 
Although it cannot be empirically demonstrated that the difference in findings between 
this paper and Silberman’s (1976) is attributable to the use of different measures of 
severity of punishment, the replication of Silberman’s hypotheses, and findings 
concerning the relationships between the index variables suggests that this incongruity 
is not attributable to sample characteristics. The stronger effects of the refined 
measure of perceived severity of punishment is consistent with Grasmick and Bryjak’s
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findings.
Third, Grasmick and McLaughlin believe that Silberman should have treated 
peer involvement and moral commitment as separate conditional variables mediating 
the effects of certainty and severity of punishment on criminal involvement. Table 6 
presents results of analyses that respond to the criticism. It is clear that moral 
commitment and peer involvement by themselves mediate the effects of the threat of 
punishment measures on drug use.
The last criticism offered by Grasmick and McLaughlin concerns Silberman’s 
use of path analysis. According to these critics, "given the pattern of relationships 
[Silberman] uncovers and his interaction hypotheses, he should not have chosen to 
present the combined effects of the independent variables on Criminal Involvement in 
the form of a path analysis." Grasmick and McLaughlin also note that the path 
diagram Silberman chooses "does not depict the causal chain he describes [Silberman 
449]" (276).
I agree that path analysis is inappropriate here. If Silberman (1976) was 
correct in describing the relationship between the independent and dependent variables 
as one approaching a causal chain, then the reviewers are correct in their assessment 
of Silberman’s actual path diagrams (1976:450; 452). Although Silberman discusses 
causality and his path analysis assumes it, his propositions are not causal. Because 
the data here and in Silberman’s research are cross-sectional, there is no a priori 
knowledge of the temporal ordering of the independent and dependent variables. 
Silberman (1976:444) addresses this problem when he states:
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Respondents are asked at a given point in time what their current beliefs are 
regarding the efficacy of the law enforcement process and then asked to report 
their past criminal behavior. In order to assert that these beliefs affect the 
individual’s behavior, we must assume a degree of stability in those beliefs. 
However, it is equally reasonable to assume that the respondent’s current 
beliefs are a product of his past behavior, particularly if he has committed an 
offense and was not caught. Are we really testing deterrence theory? Or are 
we measuring the effects of past experiences on current beliefs regarding the 
certainty and severity of punishment? The truth probably lies between the 
extremes. In other words, beliefs and behavior interact in such a way as to 
suggest a two-way process. Those who commit an offense and get away with 
it are less likely to believe that people like themselves are caught by the police 
for committing these offenses. In turn, the belief that one is unlikely to be 
caught predisposes the person to commit the offense. To resolve this 
methodological and theoretical problem requires a longitudinal study observing 
the interaction between beliefs and behavior over time.
Path analysis assumes additive relationships among the independent variables.
Although minor interaction effects were found in the regression analyses, it is clear
from a glance at Tables 7 and 10 that morality and peer involvement are the dominant
variables in the model. Therefore, because the effects of certainty of punishment,
and, to a lesser degree, severity of punishment are dependent on morality and peer
involvement, these variables would not have the same exogenous relationships with
the dependent variable as those in Silberman’s path diagram. Nevertheless, the main
purpose here was to test Silberman’s hypotheses, and that has been done.
Conclusion
Deterrence is broadly defined as the constraining effects of rules, laws, and 
sanctions. It is a notion that has become a part of the thinking of agents of social 
control. However, research to date on deterrence does not allow any definitive
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conclusions. Like many of the concepts used by social researchers, there has been 
disagreement over how deterrence, and at times its component terms, should be 
measured or conceptualized.
In the 1970’s, more researchers began exploring specific deterrence. They 
measured deterrence in terms of individual perceptions rather than, or along with, 
measures of imposed punishment certainty and/or severity (e.g., punishment rates). 
This research was advanced through the use of self-reported data on criminal 
behavior.
Matthew Silberman’s (1976) paper was the first to take a broader look at the 
deterrence doctrine’s place among other criminological theories. By infusing terms 
from social learning and social control theories, he sought to provide an axiomatic 
theory of deterrence. This paper solidifies what Silberman found: 1) a general 
theory of deterrence is plausible; 2) there are definable relationships among all of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable; and 3) moral commitment to norms 
and peer involvement are the most significant predictors of criminal involvement 
and/or drug use.
Aday and Thomson (1992:425) have suggested that a broader definition of 
deterrence than that implied by current national drug policies is needed to be able to 
understand the dynamics of deterrence. In particular, they point to the importance of 
informal social control in the deterrence process. Findings with regard to peer 
involvement, though primarily supporting the importance of associations with 
delinquent peers, also suggest the potential power of informal social controls through
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peers.
Silberman (1976) has broadened the deterrence model to include potentially 
powerful theories of differential association and moral commitment to norms. Further 
research with a sample more representative of the general population is needed. At 
present, some of the more frequently used national longitudinal samples of juveniles 
and young adults contain no items that could be identified as deterrence items (i.e., 
perceptions of certainty or severity of punishment). Longitudinal data are needed to 
more fully investigate the temporal aspects of behavior and beliefs with respect to 
deterrence. Although future researchers may want to consider the deterrent effects on 
general criminal involvement as Silberman did, it is felt that drug use should be 
treated as a separate dependent variable. It seems likely that not all crimes are the 
same, and that deterrence is affected by the character of the behavior under study.
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APPENDIX I: INDEXES
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I. MORALITY INDEX
Regardless o f how safe or dangerous (alcohol; marijuana; cocaine) might be, it is wrong to 
use if  it is illegal to use.
1. Alcohol =  ALCL9
2. Marijuana =  MARL9
3. Cocaine =  COCL9
All responses were Likert-scaled as follows: 1 ’strongly disagree’, 2 ’disagree’, 3 ’no 
opinion’, 4 ’agree’, 5 ’strongly agree’. The index is the sum o f ALCL9, MARL9, and COCL9.
Range Mean S.D.
Morality Index 3 to 15 9.6 3.56
Dichotomized as follows:
3 to 9 =  Low Morality
10 to 15 =  High Morality
II. PEER INVOLVEMENT INDEX
Out o f your five closest friends, estimate how many have ever used (marijuana; cocaine).
1. Marijuana =  FRIENMAR
2. Cocaine =  FRIENCOC
The index is the sum o f FRIENMAR and FRIENCOC.
Range Mean S.D.
Peer Index 0 to 10 2.6 2.41
Dichotomized as follows:
0 to 2 =  Low Peer Involvement 
3 to 10 =  High Peer Involvement
III. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT INDEX
If you were arrested and convicted for (drinking in public; possession o f marijuana; selling 
a pound o f cocaine), do you think your future would be affected negatively?
1. Alcohol =  CONVALC
2. Marijuana =  CONVMAR
3. Cocaine =  CONVCOC
All three items are likert-scaled as follows: 1 ’no’, 2 ’yes, a little’, 3 ’yes, somewhat’, 4 ’yes, 
seriously’. The index is the sum of CONVALC, CONVMAR, and CONVCOC.
Range Mean S.D.
Severity Index 3 to 12 9.7 1.75
Dichotomized as follows:
3 to 9 =  Low Severity
10 to 12 =  High Severity
IV. CERTAINTY OF PUNISHMENT INDEX
A. What do you think is the chance that you would be arrested if  you were under 21 and 
drinking at a bar?
34
1. Alcohol =  PROBALC 
B. If you were selling (marijuana; grams o f cocaine) from an apartment, what do you think 
would be the chance o f getting arrested?
1. Marijuana =  PROBMAR
2. Cocaine =  PROBCOC
All three items are Likert-scaled as follows: 1 ’no chance at all’, 2 ’a slight possibility’, 3 
’somewhat likely’, 4 ’almost certain’.
Range Mean S.D.
Certainty Index 3 to 12 7.6 1.43
Dichotomized as follows:
3 to 7 =  Low Certainty 
8  to 12 =  High Certainty
V. DRUG USE INDEX
A. Estimate the number o f days within the past month on which you became intoxicated 
from alcohol.
Recoded: 0 to 0 ’Have not been intoxicated’
All else to 1 ’Have been intoxicated’
B. About how old were you the first time you had any type o f (marijuana; cocaine)? 
Recoded: Never used it to 0 ’Have not used’
All other responses 1 ’Have used’
Range Mean S.D.
Drug Use Index 0 to 3 1.1 .93
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Table 1 
Indicator Variable Recodings
Moral commitment: Alcohol Marijuana Cocaine
Strongly disagree 0 0 0
Disagree 0 0 0
No opinion 1 1 1
Agree 1 1 1
Strongly agree 1 1 1
Peer involvement: Marijuana Cocaine
0 0 0
1-5 1 1
Perceived severity: Alcohol Marijuana Cocaine
No 0 0 0
Yes, a little 0 0 0
Yes, somewhat 1 1 1
Yes, seriously 1 1 1
Perceived certainty: Alcohol Marijuana Cocaine
No chance 0 0 0
Slight chance 0 0 0
Somewhat likely 1 1 1
Almost certain 1 1 1
Table 2
Independent Indicator Variables and Three Drug Use Variables 
Phi Coefficients (Unequal N ’s)
Offense Moral
Commit
Certainty
of
Punishment
Severity
of
Punishment
Peer
Involve
Percent
Commit
Offense
Alcohol -.30*** -.07 -.18*** N/A 61
Marijuana -.36*** -.14*** -.13*** .39*** 39
Cocaine -.25"* -.08 .03 .32*** 9
***p <  .001
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Table 3
Independent Index Variables, Three Drug Use Variables, and Drug Use Index 
Zero-order Correlation Coefficients (Unequal N ’s)
MORAL CERTAIN SEVERITY PEERS
DRUG USE -.44*“* -.16"“ -.24"“ .63“ *
Alcohol -.29"* - . 1 0 " -.17"* .35*"
Marijuana -.38"“ -.14*" -.2 0 "“ .61*“
Cocaine -.27*" - .1 2 "* -.15*" .43*"
" p <  .01 *"p< .001
Table 4
Zero-order Correlation Matrix for Index Variables 
Total Sample (N =  729)
MORALITY CERTAINTY SEVERITY PEERS
CERTAINTY .15*"
SEVERITY .29*" .25”“
PEERS -.39*" -.2 0 "* -.23*"
DRUG USE -.44*“ -.16*" -.24*" .63"*
p <  .001
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Table 5
Zero-order Correlation Matrix for Index Variables 
Male(N= 28  l)/Fem ale(N=432) 
Respondents
MORALITY CERTAINTY SEVERITY PEERS
CERTAINTY 
SEVERITY 
PEERS 
DRUG USE
.14"/. 11 
.25***/.27*“ 
-.36*"/-.40*" 
-.39*"/-.43"*
.22*"/. 24"* 
-.19"*/-. 18"* 
- .1 2 /-. 16"*
-.2 0 "*/-.2 1 "* 
-.23"*/-.21"* .6 6 "*/. 60*"
~ p < . 0 1  "*p< . 0 0 1
Table 6
Mean Scores on Drug Use Index by Independent Variable Indexes
Low High t
Controls Mean Mean
MORALITY 1.46 0.79 10.39***
Certainty Low 1.64 Low . 8 8
High 1.27 High .73
Severity Low 1.63 Low .98
High 1.25 High .69
PEERS 0.64 1.67 -17.60***
Certainty Low .74 Low 1.78
High .58 High 1.53
Severity Low .75 Low 1.83
High .59 High 1.46
CERTAINTY 1.26 0.95 6 7 7 ***
SEVERITY 1.35 0.89 4.49***
*** p < . 0 0 1
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Table 7
Base Model: Independent Index Variables Using Drug Use Index 
as Dependent Variable 
Multiple Regression
Index Beta SE Beta
MORALITY .031
PEERS .533*** .031
CERTAINTY -.013 .029
SEVERITY -.058 .030
(Constant) 1.439
R2 = .4 4
*** pc.ooi
Table 8
Interaction Model: Interaction Terms Using Drug Use Index 
as Dependent Variable 
Multiple Regression
Term Beta SE Beta
MP -.005 .072
MS -.198** .066
MC -.054 .070
PS .263* .113
PC .264* .106
SC -.057 .040
(Constant) 
R2 =  .43
1.277
* p <  .05
** p <  . 0 1
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Table 9
Drug Use Index on Index Measures o f Peer Involvement and 
Certainty with MoralityxSeverity Term 
Multiple Regression
Index Beta SE Beta
MS -.224*** .031
PEERS .539*** .031
CERTAINTY - . 0 1 0 .029
(Constant) 1.067
R2 =  .44
*** p < . 0 0 1
Full Model:
Table 10
Regression o f Drug Use Index on All Variables 
Multiple Regression
r Beta SE Beta
MORALITY -.4 4 *** -.192*** .032
PEERS .63*** .534*** .031
CERTAINTY -. 16*** -.008 .029
SEVERITY -.24*** -.053 .030
Gender _19*** .066* .029
Urbanism -.05 -.035 .028
(Constant) 1.277*** 
R2 =  .45
* p < .0 5
* * *  p <  001
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NOTES
1. Aday (1990) traces this formal/informal dichotomy to Max Weber’s three types o f authority: 
rational, traditional, and charismatic (For a more detailed discussion, see Aday, 1990 or Aday and 
Thomson, 1992).
2. Silberman (1976) found that severity o f punishment had no effect on the dependent variables, 
criminal involvement and crime rate. This has been an interesting variable in the deterrence literature. 
Some have found severity o f punishment to have a significant and important effect on criminal 
involvement, whereas others have found that severity o f punishment is a superfluous concept (Meier 
and Johnson, 1977; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980). However, Geerken and Gove (1975:501) note that 
severity o f punishment is entangled with certainty o f punishment, and although severity may not have a 
direct effect on criminal involvement, it has at worst an indirect relationship.
3. For the current research, it is assumed that the prevailing norm (law) is that it is wrong for college 
students to use drugs.
4. Silberman (1976:455) highlights the relationship between peer involvement and the threat of 
punishment by suggesting that the threat o f peers being sanctioned is significant. He states: "The 
threat o f punishment is an effective deterrent only when the referent is an extremely personal one, i.e ., 
’someone like yourself.’ The arrest o f others, although personally acquainted, apparently can be 
rationalized away; after all, they are "not like me." This would imply that it is the threat o f others 
being sanctioned rather than their arrest which has a deterrent effect.
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5. Silberman (1976:457) notes that the only proposition which systematically app^rs to hold true 
according to his findings is the first one. The others have their own sets o f contingencies.
6 . Grasmick and Bryjak (1980:483) provide support for this test in their own analysis o f deterrence. It 
is their contention that any controversy which may have existed concerning the use o f product terms in 
testing for interaction with multiple regression has been quashed by recent researchers (see e .g ., P. 
Allison. 1977. Testing for Interaction in Multiple Regression. American Journal o f Sociology 
83(July): 114-53).
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